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The Law of Civil Commitment in Pennsylvania:
Towards a Consistent Interpretation of the Mental
Health Procedures Act
Steven B. Datloft
One cold winter's night, Maxwell Edison,' a junior premedical
student at the University of Philadelphia,2 was brought to the
Emergency Room of the Hospital of the University of Philadelphia
(HUPh) by his girlfriend, Joan. Max created a disturbance in the
waiting room, loudly and angrily hurling abusive epithets at Joan,
whom he accused of tricking him into coming to the hospital when
he believed they were going to the movies.
Joan told the Emergency Room physician, and then the
psychiatrist on call, Dr. Sigmund, of Max's increasingly bizarre
behavior. Max had not been sleeping or eating well for several
days, Joan related. In addition, he had stopped attending classes
and doing his schoolwork. He was drinking heavily, smoking
* J.D. 1999, Temple University School of Law; M.D. 1983, University of Rochester School
of Medicine; B.A. 1979, Yale University. My thanks to Professor Frank McClellan for his
advice and comments on this article.
1. THE BEATLEs, Maxwel's Silver Hammer, on ABBEY ROAD (EMI Records 1969). With
apologies to the Beatles. In the song, Maxwell Edison murders his girlfriend Joan and his
teacher with a silver harmmer.
2. All names of institutions in this vignette are fictitious.
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marijuana daily, and Joan thought he might be abusing other drugs
as well. His conversations were rambling and nonsensical, usually
having something to do with a "silver hammer" that Max insisted
was a sign from God that he was the new Messiah. He talked about
his expectation of imminent death and resurrection in such a way
that Joan feared he was considering suicide. Joan also told the
psychiatrist that she was afraid of Max; his temper had grown
short, and he frequently took offense at casual, innocuous remarks,
misconstruing them as insults. Furthermore, he had struck Joan in
the course of an outburst six weeks ago, leaving her with a black
eye and various cuts and bruises.
When Dr. Sigmund questioned Max, he initially responded in a
guarded fashion. Gradually, however, he became more expansive,
and ultimately he corroborated the information related by Joan.
The doctor gave Max a diagnosis of "Substance-Induced
Psychotic Disorder, rule out Manic-Depressive Disorder."3 He
recommended that Max be admitted to the hospital for inpatient
treatment consisting of psychotherapy and medication. Faced with
this recommendation, Max's anger escalated. He adamantly refused
hospitalization, insisting, "I'm not a nut-case!"
Joan was incredulous when Dr. Sigmund accepted Max's
decision. She reiterated her fear of Max, and requested to petition
to involuntarily commit Max to the hospital. The doctor was
sympathetic, but said there was nothing he could do: Max's
behavior did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. Dr.
Sigmund explained that he had tried many times in the past to get
patients like Max involuntarily committed, but unless the patient
had actually threatened to harm himself or someone else, and had
taken concrete steps to carry out the threats within the past thirty
days, the court always denied the commitment. Moreover, the court
would not involuntarily commit a patient whose primary mental
disorder was related to drug or alcohol problems. He suggested
that Joan contact Women in Crisis if she needed a safe haven,
away from Max.
Walking home, Max continued to lambaste Joan with verbal
abuse. Finally he stalked off, saying that he was going to the
movies. Instead, Max hitchhiked a ride back to his hometown of
3. Substance-Induced Psychotic Disorder is characterized by prominent delusions or
hallucinations caused by drug intoxication or withdrawal. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS FOURTH EDMON DSM-IV 310-15 (1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. Bipolar
disorder, manic phase is a mood disorder characterized by expansive or irritable mood,
grandiosity, decreased need for sleep, and disorganization of thinking. Id. at 328-32.
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Hamburg, seventy-five miles northwest of Philadelphia in Berks
County. At 4:00 a.m. his parents were awakened by a loud knocking
on the front door. After listening to several minutes of wild
discourse about silver hammers and the apocalypse, Mr. and Mrs.
Edison drove Max to the local Emergency Room. He was then
involuntarily committed to the psychiatric ward of the hospital.
How is it that Dr. Sigmund of HUPh deemed Max as ineligible for
involuntary commitment where a mere four hours later, Max was
involuntarily committed in Hamburg? Pursuant to answering this
question, Part I of this article will review the development of the
modem law of civil commitment in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania
legislature responded to societal trends favoring individual
autonomy over paternalism and to United States Supreme Court
decisions protecting individual liberties with the Mental Health
Procedures Act (PMHPA) of 1976.4 This Act established that a
severely mentally ill individual could only be involuntarily
committed if he was proven dangerous to himself or others.5
Part II considers inconsistencies in the interpretation of the
PMHPA and in its application to involuntary commitment. The Act
excludes "senile, alcoholic, or drug dependent" persons from its
definition of severe mental illness.6 Individuals with no additional
psychiatric diagnoses thus are ineligible for involuntary
commitment. These exclusions stem from outdated medical
concepts and currently create confusion and serve no useful
purpose. The legislature should therefore amend the PMHPA to
remove these exclusions.
Part II further considers the PMHPAs "clear and present danger"
standard for proving dangerousness. 7 Because Pennsylvania courts
interpret the standard inconsistently, individuals with similar
behaviors may be committed for involuntary treatment while others
are released. Moreover, mental health review officers in urban
centers tend to interpret the standard such that proving
dangerousness is exceedingly difficult. This article recommends a
consistent interpretation of the clear and present danger standard
based on the plain meaning of the PMHPA. The Act states that
clear and present danger to oneself or others may be demonstrated
by threats of harm and acts in furtherance of these threats.8 The
4. PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (West 1998).
5. Title 50 § 7301.
6. Id. § 7102.
7. Id. § 7301.
8. See infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text for discussion of how clear and
1999
Duquesne Law Review
PMHPA's wording does not compel a court to conclude that the
clear and present danger standard can be met only if threats and
acts in furtherance of threats are revealed. Rather, the legislature
intended to allow courts to determine whether the clear and
present danger standard was met without the restrictions of a rigid
formula. Such a reading of the PMHPA will allow courts discretion
to balance individuals' rights with the need to protect severely
mentally ill individuals from causing harm to themselves and
society.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL COMMITMENT LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA
The protection of the rights of the individual against the
government is a basic tenet of the United States Constitution.9 Yet,
society has recognized that there are situations when vulnerable
individuals must be protected, and when the rights of the individual
must be restricted for the good of society as a whole. 10 Hence there
exists a tension in our society, reflected in American jurispru-
dence, between an individual's right to exercise autonomy in
decision-making, and society's right to paternalistically make
decisions for that individual." Nowhere is this dichotomous tension
more evident than in the areas of mental health treatment and
mental health law, as exemplified by the problem of involuntary
commitment of the mentally ill.t2
By definition, an involuntary commitment is considered when an
individual refuses voluntary psychiatric hospitalization. Thus, the
individual at the very least disagrees with mental health
professionals, and possibly his family as well, about his need for
hospitalization. He may also disagree, at a more basic level, about
his need for any treatment or whether he is in fact mentally ill.
13
For most of the twentieth century, however, Pennsylvania, like
most American jurisdictions, followed a paternalistic,
present danger may be demonstrated under the PMHPA.
9. See GER ED GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415-16 (13th ed.
1997) (discussing Constitution's protection of individual freedoms).
10. See RALPH REISNER & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYsTEM
611-12 (2d ed. 1990) (comparing law of civil commitment with criminal law, and citing latter
as example of area of law where interests of society are paramount).
11. Id.
12. Donald H. J. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of
Revisions in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil
Commitment, 39 VAND. L REV. 83, 85-86 (1986).
13. Id. at 95.
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"need-for-treatment" based standard for involuntary commitment. 4
According to this standard, states' authority to involuntarily commit
an individual stemmed from the "parens patriae" and "police
power" doctrines. 15 Under the "parens patriae" principle, the state
could act for the good of the individual, to mandate inpatient
treatment for mental illness when doctors believed that such
treatment was necessary to restore the individual's health. 16 Under
the "police power" doctrine, states also reserved the authority to
involuntarily commit a mentally ill individual for the good of
society, to protect others from harm. 7
Implicit in commitment standards based on parens patriae and
police power doctrines was deference to the medical profession
and trust in the judgment of physicians. 8 Pennsylvania's Mental
Health Act of 1951 followed this deferential standard.19 This Act
permitted the involuntary commitment to a mental health facility of
persons "thought to be mentally ill and in need of observation,
diagnosis, and treatment" when two physicians affirmed the need
for such commitment.20 Largely because of the Kennedy era
impetus to provide more decentralized, community-based services
for the mentally ill,21 the Pennsylvania legislature revised the 1951
Act in 1966.2 The resulting Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental
Retardation Act (PMHMRA) adhered to the earlier Act's standard
for commitment of "mentally ill" individuals based on need for
treatmentY3
14. REISNE, supra note 10, at 599; see also Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil
Commitment and Illness Politics: Assessing the Current Debate and Outlining a Future
Direction, 7 J. L & HEALTH 131, 136-37 (1992/93) (discussing historical development of
paternalistic, need-for-treatment based comnntment laws).
15. See Arrigo, supra note 14, at 137-39 (discussing "parens patriae" and "police power"
doctrines); John E.B. Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in
Need of Change, 29 ViuL L REv. 367, 380-88 (1983/84) (discussing same doctrines).
16. See Arrigo, supra note 14, at 136-37.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 136 (discussing deference to physicians as part of a "need-for-treatment"
approach to civil commitment justified under parens patriae and police power doctrines).
19. 1951 Pa. Laws §§ 326-332.
20. Id. § 326.
21. 1966 Pa. Legis. Journal Sept. 27, 1966 at 76-78.
22. PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 4101-4704 (West 1969) (repealed in part 1976).
23. TItle 50 §§ 4404-4406 (repealed in part 1976). Section 4404 provided that "[a]
written application for commitment to a facility may be made in the interest of any person
who "appears to be mentally disabled and in need of care." Id. § 4404. Section 4404 further
required that "[sluch application shall be accompanied by the certificates of two
physicians . . . who have found that ... such person is mentally disabled and in need of
care." Id. Section 4406 permitted involuntary commitment through a civil court hearing of
similar individuals "believed to be mentally disabled, and in need of care or treatment." Id. §
1999
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A. The United States Supreme Court Protects Individual Rights
in Civil Commitment Cases
In the 1970's, societal trends favoring individual autonomy and
denigrating paternalism fostered challenges to need-for-treatment
based civil commitment statutes.24 The groundwork for change was
laid by the United States Supreme Court in the 1972 case
Humphrey v. Cady.25  The Humphrey Court highlighted the
seriousness of the constitutional issues involved in civil
commitment in recognizing that commitment involves a "massive
curtailment of liberty."26 Moreover, the Court concluded that
involuntary commitment could not be justified "solely on the
medical judgment that the defendant is mentally ill and treatable
[without also showing] that his potential for doing harm, to himself
or others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of
liberty."
27
Humphrey thus articulated the constitutional rights at issue in
civil commitments. Later in 1972, the Humphrey analysis was
applied for the first time in a constitutional challenge to a state's
civil commitment law.28 In Lessard v. Schmidt, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin considered a
class action contesting the constitutionality of Wisconsin's civil
commitment law.29 The plaintiffs alleged the law violated their due
process rights because it failed "to describe the standard of
commitment so that persons may be able to ascertain the standard
of conduct under which they may be detained with reasonable
certainty."30  The court agreed, declaring that the statute
unconstitutionally allowed commitment without proof that the
4406. See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text for further discussion of the PMHMRA of
1966, in particular noting the extreme paternalism inherent in section 4404, allowing
involuntary commitment of an individual without the protection of any judicial proceeding.
24. See Reisner supra note 10, at 599-600 (discussing influence of civil rights movement
of 1960's on attitudes towards paternalistic model of involuntary commitment).
25. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
26. Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 509. Humphrey concerned an equal protection claim
brought by a sexual offender convicted under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act. Id. at 506. The
plaintiff claimed that as a mentally ill sexual offender, he was involuntarily committed to a
psychiatric facility without the procedural protections afforded to non-criminal mentally ill
individuals under the Wisconsin Mental Health Act. Id. at 508.
27. Id.
28. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated by Schmidt v.
Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), remanded to Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F Supp. 1376 (1976)
(judgment failed to meet specificity regulations of injunctive orders).
29. Lessard, 349 F Supp. at 1082.
30. Id.
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individual was beyond a reasonable doubt both mentally ill and
dangerous.
31
Three years after Lessard, in O'Connor v. Donaldson,32 the
Supreme Court applied the "mentally ill plus dangerous" standard
to the commitment of a schizophrenic patient confined against his
will in a Florida state hospital for fifteen years.3 Given
uncontroverted evidence that the patient had never posed a danger
to himself or others, the Court held that the forced hospitalization
violated his constitutional right to freedom
4
While the O'Connor Court thus established "mentally ill plus
dangerous" as the constitutionally acceptable standard for
involuntary commitment, the question of the standard of proof
required under the due process clause to commit an individual
remained to be settled by Addington v. Texas.35 The Addington
Court opined that the reasonable doubt standard was too difficult
for the state to meet given the uncertainties of psychiatric
diagnosis.36 The Court was wary of imposing a standard so
stringent that the result would be "an unreasonable barrier to
needed medical treatment."37 At the same time, the requirements of
due process necessitated a standard higher than the preponderance
of the evidence standard applicable to other civil cases. 8 Chief
Justice Burger, writing a unanimous opinion, therefore concluded
that the standard of clear and convincing evidence struck the
proper balance between protecting the liberties of the individual
and the needs of the state.
3 9
The impact of the Humphrey-O'Connor-Addington line of cases
on involuntary commitment laws has been dramatic. One
commentator notes that by 1990, virtually all states had replaced
"mental illness plus need for treatment" statutes with laws that
prescribe "mental illness plus dangerousness" as the standard for
civil commitment. 4
0
31. Id. at 1103.
32. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
33. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 564-65.
34. Id. at 575.
35. 441 U.S. 418.
36. Addington, 441 U.S. at 432.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 432-33.
39. Id. at 431.
40. REISNER supra note 10, at 601; see Hermann, supra note 12, at 106 n.60 (citing
Alabama, Washington D.C., Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia as examples of
jurisdictions limiting involuntary commitment to those mentally ill individuals who are
1999
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B. Pennsylvania Courts Respond to the Winds of Change
Pennsylvania kept pace with the national trends in civil
commitment law. In 1971, in Dixon v. Attorney General of
Pennsylvania,41 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania struck down Section 4404 of the PMIIMRA
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42
Section 4404 allowed involuntary commitment of an individual
upon the certification of two physicians that the person needed
care, without requiring any court proceedings." In Dixon, seven
patients involuntarily committed to Farview State Hospital pursuant
to Section 4404 challenged its constitutionality in a class action
suit." The plaintiffs originally were confined to Farview, a
maximum-security forensic psychiatric facility, on criminal
convictions.45 After the convictions terminated, the plaintiffs were
committed indefinitely to Farview under Section 4404.46
The tone of the Dixon court conveyed outrage that the plaintiffs
were thus deprived of their liberty without benefit of representation
by counsel and without any judicial proceedings. 47 The court
reviewed Supreme Court cases where these due process
protections were afforded defendants in criminal and juvenile
delinquency proceedings, and reasoned that the same procedural
protections should be guaranteed in civil commitments.48 In
concluding that Section 4404 was unconstitutional on its face,49 the
undivided court found the statute "almost completely devoid of the
due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment."5°
The Middle District of Pennsylvania also invalidated Section 4406
of the PMHMRA five years later, in Goldy v. Beal.5' In contrast with
Section 4404's provision for commitment by two physicians without
a court proceeding, Section 4406 provided a court hearing as an
dangerous to themselves or others).
41. 325 F Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
42. Dixon, 325 F Supp. at 972.
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 4404 (West 1998) (repealed in part 1976).
44. Dixon, 325 F. Supp. at 967.
45. Id. at 967-69.
46. Id. at 967-68.
47. Id. at 972-73. The court's opinion includes a verbatim exchange between Judge
Biggs and defense counsel, in which Judge Biggs is incredulous that a mere "paper notation"
was sufficient to accomplish the commitment, and that no formal hearing was required. Id.
48. Id. at 971-72 (citing Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386'
U.S. 605 (1967)).
49. Dixon, 325 F. Supp. at 970.
50. Id. at 972.
51. 429 F Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
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alternate method for involuntary commitment. 52 While procedural
protections had been the issue in Dixon, in Goldy the court
scrutinized the constitutionality of the PMHMRXs "mental illness
plus need for treatment" standard for involuntarily comnitment.5
The Goldy court found this standard unconstitutionally vague.M
Judge Nealon's opinion for a unanimous three-judge court criticized
the vagueness of Section 4406, noting it provided no guidelines
about the severity of illness required to make a patient
committable, and gave no guidance about the type of treatment
that was needed.55 He reasoned that such vagueness could easily
result in arbitrary enforcement of the statute, and that such an
arbitrary interference with an individual's constitutionally protected
right of physical liberty violated due process.
56 With its civil
commitment statute thus declared unconstitutional, the
Pennsylvania legislature had no choice but to enact a new law in
accordance with the constitutionally accepted "mental illness plus
dangerousness" standard for commitment.
C. The Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976
In July of 1976, the Pennsylvania legislature repealed Section
4406 of the PMHMRA and enacted the Mental Health Procedures
Act (PMHPA), the law governing civil commitment that remains in
force today.57 The PMHPA differs from its predecessor in several
ways. First, the PMHPA provides that only "severe" mental illness
warrants involuntary comnmitment.M The statute, however, does not
define "severe."-9 Second, in addition to demonstrating severe
mental illness, the state must also prove the individual dangerous
to herself or others in order to warrant involuntary commitment
0
Third, the individual's dangerousness to oneself or others must be
"clear and present."
61
The PMHPA provides that clear and present danger to others
must be shown "by establishing that within the past 30 days the
person has inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on
52. PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 50 § 4406 (West 1998) (repealed in part 1976).
53. Goldy, 429 F Supp. at 646-48.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 648.
56. Id.
57. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (West 1998).






another and that there is a reasonable probability that such
conduct will be repeated."62 The Act then provides an example of
how such clear and present danger to others may be demonstrated,
without mandating that the danger must be shown in this fashion:
"[A] clear and present danger of harm to others may be
demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats of harm
and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit
harm. "63
A clear and present danger of harm to oneself must be
established in one of three ways: either by showing that the person
is unable to care for himself, that the person has attempted suicide,
or that he has substantially mutilated himself.6 An individual who
is unable to care for himself may be involuntary committed only if
there is a "reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury
or serious physical debilitation would ensue within thirty days
unless adequate treatment were afforded under this act."6s A person
who has attempted suicide or mutilated himself may be committed
only if there is a reasonable probability of a repeat of the
self-injurious behavior.66 Clear and present danger of suicide may
be demonstrated by proof that the individual has made threats to
commit suicide and has taken action in furtherance of these
threats.67 By contrast, the PMHPA mandates that clear and present
danger of self-mutilation "shal/ be established by proof that the
person has made threats to commit mutilation and has committed
acts which are in furtherance of the threat to commit mutilation."68
II. INCONSISTENCY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PMHPA
The PMHPA establishes two absolute requirements for involun-
tary civil commitment: severe mental illness and clear and present
danger of serious harm to oneself or others as a result of such
mental illness.69 The PMHPA is difficult to apply in practice,
however, because it provides no specific definition of mental illness
and because the clear and present danger standard is vague.
62. Id.




67. Id. (italics added).
68. Title 50, § 7301 (italics added). See infra notes 123-38 and accompanying text for
discussion of the significance of PMHPA:s explicit, wording regarding whether threats and
acts in furtherance of threats are necessary to establish clear and present danger.
69. Id.
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A. What Constitutes Mental Illness for the Purposes of the
PMHPA?
The PMHPA fails to define what constitutes mental illness except
to exclude certain conditions from the definition: "Persons who are
... senile, alcoholic, or drug dependent shall receive mental health
treatment only if they are also diagnosed as mentally ill, but these
conditions of themselves shall not be deemed to constitute mental
illness."70 Because the excluded conditions themselves are not
defined by the PMHPA, the exclusions merely add to the confusion
in defining what does constitute mental illness for the purposes of
the statute.
Senility, moreover, has no actual medical definition.71 Webster's
Dictionary defines senile as "exhibiting a loss of mental faculties
associated with old age."72 Psychiatry classifies these changes of
aging along a continuum, from benign forgetfulness that is part of
the normal aging process 73 to debilitating conditions characterized
by multiple cognitive deficits known as "dementias."74 To further
complicate matters, the most common dementia, Alzheimer's
Disease,75 was historically and still is commonly known as "Senile
Dementia."76  Dementias, however, are clearly considered by
psychiatry to constitute mental disorders. 77 At least some senile
conditions are therefore also classified by psychiatry as mental
disorders and accordingly should not be excluded from the
PMHPA's definition of mental illness.
Not surprisingly, courts struggle with how to deal with
cognitively impaired elderly persons who are subjects of
involuntary commitment proceedings.78 Psychiatrists who frequently
testify at commitment hearings and mental health review officers
authorized to conduct commitment hearings 79 understand the
70. Id. § 7102.
71. In re Rodgers, Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 92 (1980).
72. WEBSTER'S SEvENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoNARY 789 (1965).
73. HARoLD L KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK POCKET HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 25
(1990).
74. DSM-V, supra note 3, at 133.
75. Id. at 137.
76. DSM-Il DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS THIRD EDITION 124
(1980). The term "senile" was used to indicate an age of onset over 65. Id.
77. Dementias are a major category of psychiatric disorders. Twenty-two pages of
psychiatry's diagnostic classification manual are devoted to descriptions of these conditions.
DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 133-55.
78. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text for discussion of this issue.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7109 (West 1998).
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PMHPA as excluding dementias from its definition of mental
illness.80 Psychiatrists will often use an alternate diagnosis to avoid
the risk of a review officer declining to commit an individual
because the doctor attributes the dangerous behavior solely to
dementia.
8 1
Few Pennsylvania cases have considered the practical problems
associated with the exclusion of senility from the PMHPA:s
definition of mental illness. In 1980, the Allegheny Court of
Common Pleas provided guidance on the meaning of senility for
PMHPA purposes in In re Rodgers."2 Timothy Rodgers appealed his
involuntary commitment, arguing that his diagnosis of "organic
brairr syndrome of a psychotic degree"8s was indistinguishable from
senility and therefore could not be grounds for commitment.84
The court disagreed, concluding that organic brain syndrome
with psychosis differs significantly from senility.85 In thus holding
that Rodgers' condition came under the rubric of the PMHPA, the
court opined that the Pennsylvania legislature intended to exclude
"senility as that word is commonly understood, the benign changes
of age . . . without a loss of ability to function as to reality;"86 it
was not excluding "senility with psychosis."87
The holding of Rodgers, therefore, clearly means that an
individual with dementia8 who is overtly psychotic - out of touch
with reality8 9 - comes under the purview of the PMHPA. Left
unanswered by Rodgers is whether a demented person with
80. Telephone interview with Kenneth Certa, M.D., Past President of Philadelphia
Psychiatric Society (Oct. 22, 1998); interview with Robin Levengood, Esq., Berks County
Mental Health Review Officer, in Reading, PA (Oct. 28, 1998).
81. Interview with Kenneth Certa, M.D., supra note 80.
82. In re Rodgers, Pa. D. & C.3d at 90-97.
83. Psychiatric diagnosis has traditionally considered dementia to be one of the
Organic Brain Syndromes. The term has been dropped by DSM-IV to avoid the confusion that
resulted from the implication that these conditions were caused by specific abnormalities of
the brain whereas other psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia and manic-depressive
disorder were not. DSM-IV supra note 3, at 123. Psychosis is usually defined as a disorder of
thinling characterized by the presence of delusions, hallucinations, or gross disorganization
of thought processes. Id. at 770. Delusions are false beliefs based on incorrect inferences
about external reality. Id. at 765. Hallucinations are false perceptions that occur without
external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ. Id. at 767.
84. Pa. D. & C.3d at 92-93.
85. Id. at 97.
86. Id. at 95.
87. Id. at 97.
88. See supra notes 70-77, 80 and accompanying text for discussion of psychiatric
definitions of dementia.
89. See supra note 83 for discussion of psychiatric definitions of psychosis.
Vol. 38:1
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non-psychotic behavioral problems that could lead to a clear and
present danger to oneself or others, such as severe agitation or
belligerent behavior, also would be committable.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court provided a tentative answer to
this question in In re Remley.9° The Remley court reversed the
involuntary commitment of an eighty-two year old man with a
diagnosis of "senility," finding no evidence of his dangerousness.91
The court's analysis focused on the individual's lack of
dangerousness, not on whether he was mentally ill.92 The
implication of the court's rationale is that had the individual been
dangerous, the court would have allowed his commitment,
regardless of whether he suffered merely from dementia 93 This
emphasis on the PMHPA's dangerousness requirement for civil
commitment and de-emphasis on the mental illness requirement is
consistent with a recent United States Supreme Court decision in
civil commitment law.
94
Remley effectively provides that the clause excluding senility
from the PMHPA's coverage is irrelevant. Given that senility has no
clear meaning, and that dementias are considered mental illnesses,
the clause is confusing and anachronistic. The legislature should
therefore amend the statute to delete this clause.
The clause indicating that alcohol and drug dependence do not
constitute mental illness under the PMHPA is similarly confusing
90. 471 A.2d 514 (Pa. Super. 1984).
91. Rem/ey, 471 A.2d at 516-18.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), a man with a long history of sexually
molesting children was committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act. Id. at
350. This Act allowed the commitment of persons who, due to a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" were deemed likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence."
Id. The Kansas Supreme Court struck down the Act, holding that an individual must be
mentally ill in order to be involuntarily committed. Id. Because a "mental abnormality" was
not "mental illness," the Act failed to meet due process requirements for civil commitment,
according to the Kansas court. Id. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. In his majority opinion,
Justice Thomas emphasized society's right to override an individual's constitutionally
protected liberty interest when the individual poses "a danger to the public health and
safety." Id. at 357. This balancing of interests in favor of protecting the public led Justice
Thomas to conclude that a "mental abnormality" is sufficient constitutional grounds for
involuntary commitment of those unable to control their dangerousness. Id. at 356-59. He
insisted that "the term 'mental illness' is devoid of any talismanic significance." Id. at 359.
That is, while dangerousness by itself would not be enough to justify commitment, the Court
left to the state legislatures the task of deciding the type of mental problem required and the
definition of such condition. Id. at 358-59. Thus, Hendricks clearly gives the states the
constitutional authority to loosen the mental illness requirement as long as the
dangerousness requirement for commitment is maintained.
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and also should be deleted. Alcohol and drug dependence are
considered mental illnesses by current psychiatric diagnostic
standards. 95 Psychiatrists, however, will often use additional
diagnoses when attempting to involuntarily commit patients with
these disorders.9 6 This is because psychiatrists and mental health
review officers understand the PMHPA to exempt persons with the
sole diagnosis of alcohol or drug dependence from involuntary
commitment. 97
Mervan v. Darrell, decided by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, illustrates that courts
sometimes simply ignore the PMHPA's exclusion of alcohol
dependence.98 In Mervan, the plaintiff was hospitalized after
intentionally ingesting antifreeze in an attempt to force his mother
to give him the car keys so he could drive to the store to purchase
beer.99 Before discharge from the hospital, he was told that the
antifreeze had damaged his liver and kidneys, and that continued
drinking would therefore "eventually kill him."00 After discharge,
Mervan promptly resumed drinking alcohol. 101 At the behest of his
mother, he was then involuntarily committed. 102 The social worker
who filled out the warrant cited the dangers posed to Mervan by
alcohol consumption as the main reason for commitment.10 3 There
was no mention in the warrant of mental illness other than alcohol
abuse nor was there any mention of threats to harm himself or
others. °4 At the commitment hearing, the review officer similarly
cited Mervan's alcohol consumption and its potentially fatal
consequences. 0 5 The review officer then concluded that Mervan
was severely mentally disabled and authorized a twenty day
commitment. 106
The plaintiff failed to appeal the review officer's decision.107
Rather, he brought suit in district court alleging violation of his
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. §
95. DSM-IV, supra note 3, at 176-183.
96. Interview with Kenneth Certa, M.D., supra note 80.
97. Id.
98. CIV.A.No. 93-CV-4552, 1995 WL 262543 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 1995).
99. Mervan, 1995 WL 262543, at *1.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *2.
103. Id.
104. Mervan, 1995 WL 262543, at *1.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *6.
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1983; false imprisonment; and that civil proceedings had been
wrongfully initiated against him. 1°8 Because he neglected to appeal
the commitment, the plaintiff was estopped from relitigating the
review officer's findings that he was severely mentally disabled and
in need of involuntary commitment.' °9 In addition, defendant social
workers successfully asserted a qualified good faith immunity
defense to the Section 1983 claim. 10
By declining to reconsider the review officer's findings, the
district court avoided having to address the issue of whether the
plaintiff's commitment truly met the PMHPA standard. Mervan had
no diagnosis of mental illness other than alcohol problems, and
thus should not have qualified as "severely mentally ill" under the
statute. Thus, Mervan illustrates that despite the PMHPA's
exclusion of alcohol dependence, courts and review officers still
may lean toward allowing a commitment although the mental
illness at issue is alcohol related, if the court finds the individual's
behavior meets the dangerousness criterion."' While such decisions
are understandable because modem psychiatry classifies alcohol
and drug dependence as mental disorders, unilateral
non-compliance with the statute results in inconsistency in court
decisions, in the decisions of mental health review officers, and in
diagnostic confusion by psychiatrists. The problem could easily be
solved by removing the clause excluding alcohol and drug
dependence from the PMHPA.
B. How Clear is the Clear and Present Danger Standard?
There is more case law about the standard for dangerousness
than about the definition of mental illness under the PMHPA. Even
so, only one case about the dangerousness standard has reached
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Gibson v. DiGiacinto,11 2 the
court overturned the involuntary commitment of an individual who
108. Id. at *2. Defendants included two social workers, individually and as employees
of Northampton County Emergency Services; five police officers, individually and as officers
of the Bethlehem Police Department, a psychiatrist, and an emergency room physician. Id. at
*1-2.
109. Mervan, 1995 WL 262543, at *6.
110. Id. at *4.
111. In Mervan, the plaintiff actually may not have met the dangerousness criterion
either, given the evidence of dangerousness was based merely on a vague prediction of
premature demise because of alcohol consumption. Id. at *2, *6. See infra notes 112-36 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the clear and present danger standard.
112. 439 A.2d 105 (1981).
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had been committed to a psychiatric facility from prison." 3
According to a petition filed by the prison warden, the appellant
refused to take his medication, extinguished a burning newspaper
in his cell, and was found possessing a twisted piece of a
coathanger." 4 The mental health review officer and subsequently
the court of common pleas and the superior court all found these
behaviors constituted acceptable grounds for commitment." 5
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, opined that none of
these behaviors provided evidence of an overt act of suicide or
self-mutilation, or the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm to
others." 6 Nor was there any evidence that the appellant was unable
to care for himself."' Therefore, the court overturned the
commitment order, despite the psychiatrist's testimony that the
appellant suffered from schizophrenia with paranoid delusions."8 In
so doing the court followed the PMHPA's dictate that mental illness
by itself is not sufficient to justify commitment-evidence of
dangerousness must be present as well.
That the Gibson court reversed a commitment upheld by two
lower courts highlights the difficulty interpreting the clear and
present danger standard. Indeed, commentators have noted that
lower Pennsylvania courts have interpreted "clear and present
danger" differently from Gibson in cases with similar fact
patterns." 9 For example, in Platt v. Platt,20 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court considered whether to uphold a commitment of a
"delusional" woman manifesting bizarre behavior.12' The
documented behavior consisted of throwing a jar of Noxzema in
the bathroom, throwing a chair in the direction of one of her
children, 22 burning some of her son's belongings when she became
angry with him, and striking or attempting to strike her children
during temper tantrums.123 While ultimately remanding for further
113. Gibson, 439 A.2d at 106-07.
114. Id. at 106.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 106-07.
117. Id.
118. Gibson, 439 A.2d at 106-7.
119. Susan Paczak, Comment, Pennsylvania Standard for Involuntary Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A Clear and Present Danger?, 27 DUQ.. L REv. 325, 344
(1989).
120. 404 A.2d 410 (Pa. Super. 1979).
121. Platt, 404 A.2d at 417.
122. Whether appellant was trying to hit the child was disputed. Id. at 420 (Hoffman,
J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 417-18.
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evidence, the Platt court opined that these acts "certainly would be
sufficient for a review officer or a court to conclude that the
appellant posed a 'clear and present danger' to others."
24
The dissent disagreed, insisting there was no evidence to show
that the appellant inflicted serious harm on another. 25 The dissent
further argued that the appellant had made no threats against her
family and her conduct was provoked by the children. 26 In the
dissent's view, the absence of threats of harm or acts in
furtherance of threats was a pivotal factor in determining that the
appellant's behavior did not rise to the level of a clear and present
danger. 127 Pennsylvania courts are divided regarding whether such
threats and acts in furtherance of threats are necessary to establish
dangerousness.
In 1986, Superior Court Judge Beck remarked in Commonwealth
v. Helms 28 that the PMHPA specifically "does not require 'threats
of harm' and commission of 'acts in furtherance of the threat to
commit harm' as a condition precedent for finding 'clear and
present danger.'"129 The Act states that threats and acts "may" be
used to demonstrate dangerousness, not that they "shall" be used.'30
Judge Beck therefore concluded that threats and acts are merely
one possible way to demonstrate dangerousness. 3' The PMHPA
uses the same wording regarding the use of threats and acts to
establish clear and present danger in the section on danger to
others and in the section on suicide. 32 By contrast, in the section
on self-mutilation, the PMHPA states "clear and present danger
shall be established" by threats or acts in furtherance of the
threats.'3 Thus, Judge Beck concluded that the legislature intended
to mandate the method of proving clear and present danger only in
124. Id. at 418.
125. Id. at 420 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
127. Platt, 404 A.2d at 420. (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
128. 506 A.2d 1384 (Pa. Super. 1986).
129. Helms, 506 A.2d at 1388.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1388-89.
132. "[A] clear and present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by proof
that the person has made threats of harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the
threats to commit harm." PA STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301 (West 1998) (italics added). "[A] clear
and present danger may be demonstrated by the proof that the person has made threats to
commit suicide and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat to commit
suicide." Id. (italics added).
133. Title 50, § 7301.
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the situation of self-mutilation.'
Despite Judge Beck's cogent discussion of the statutory language
in Helms, subsequent decisions have held that threats and acts in
furtherance of the threats are necessary to establish clear and
present danger to oneself or others. In 1997, the Superior Court in
In re Woodside135 quoted the same language cited by Judge Beck,
yet reached the opposite conclusion about its meaning: "Here,
appellant's commitment was premised on the latter sentence of this
section, requiring a threat and acts in furtherance of the threat."'
3
The inconsistent interpretation by Pennsylvania courts of the
clear and present danger standard is even more pronounced at
initial commitment proceedings conducted by mental health review
officers throughout the state.1 3 The interpretation of the standard
varies widely by locality.' 31 Urban centers employ a stringent
standard that makes proof of clear and present danger extremely
difficult,' 39 while rural counties are more likely to interpret the
standard flexibly.' 40 In Philadelphia, review officers follow the
Woodside interpretation,' 4 ' requiring a threat and clearly
demonstrable acts in furtherance of the threat in order to commit a
person. 42 Outside Philadelphia, the Helms reading'" of the PMHPA
is more common.'" While review officers in these counties still
look for threats and acts in furtherance of the threats, they tend to
define such acts more loosely than review officers in
Philadelphia.' 45 Greater deference in rural counties is therefore
accorded to a psychiatrist's judgment in determining whether an
individual needs commitment for his safety or for the safety of
others.146 This difference in approach is consistent with a greater
emphasis on individual rights and patient autonomy in urban
centers, and a more paternalistic view towards patients in rural
areas. 1
47
134. Helms, 506 A.2d at 1388.
135. 699 A.2d 1293 (Pa. Super. 1997).
136. Woodside, 699 A.2d at 1296 (italics added).
137. Interview with Kenneth Certa, M.D., supra note 80.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Interview with Robin Levengood, Esq., supra note 80.
141. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
142. Interview with Kenneth Certa, M.D., supra note 80.
143. See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text.
144. Interview with Robin Levengood, Esq., supra note 80.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Interview with Kenneth Certa, M.D., supra note 80.
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According to a prominent Philadelphia psychiatrist,
approximately 50% of twenty-day involuntary commitments
requested under section 7303 of the PMHPA (commonly referred to
as "303 commitments") are denied by the review officer in
Philadelphia.148 By contrast, a review officer for rural Berks County
estimates that 98% of 303 commitments are approved 49 Data from
the Berks County Office of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
(Berks MHMR) supports this estimate. In the three month period
from July to September 1997, all thirty-five 303 petitions were
approved. 150
The disparity between commitment standards in urban and rural
settings may be even greater than indicated by this data.
Philadelphia psychiatrists, knowing the stringent dangerousness
standard required for approval of a 303 commitment, sometimes
will not pursue a 303 commitment after an initial five-day period of
emergency involuntary hospitalization under Section 7302 (a "302
commitment"). 5 ' While the psychiatrist may believe that further
hospitalization is needed because of risk of harm to the patient or
others, she may decide that the minimal chance of the review
officer sustaining the commitment simply fails to justify the cost
and time necessary to file a 303 commitment.
52
The plain language of the PMHPA indicates that Judge Beck's
reading of the statute in Helms is correct. The statute allows courts
the discretion to use other means beyond requiring both threats
and acts in furtherance of threats to determine clear and present
danger. The obvious problem with rigidly requiring both threats and
acts is that sometimes a mentally ill individual comes to the
attention of the mental health system after making a clear
statement showing suicidal or homicidal intent, but before taking
any steps to put the plan into effect. Denying a petition for
involuntary commitment in such situations without inquiring into
the seriousness of the intent has potentially tragic consequences.
The need for greater flexibility has been recognized even in
Philadelphia, where the interpretation of the dangerousness
standard has become somewhat less stringent in recent years.'5
148. Id.
149. Interview with Robin Levengood, Esq., supra note 80.
150. Emergency Services Statistics, Berks County Mental Health/Mental Retardation
Program (on file with author).




The percentage of approved 303 commitments, while still much
lower than in rural counties, has increased significantly.15 Thus the
application of the clear and present danger standard, while still far
from uniform, is gradually becoming more consistent.
III. CONCLUSION
The PMHPA establishes severe mental illness plus the clear and
present danger of harm to oneself or others as a result of this
mental illness as the requisite for involuntary commitment. The Act
thus is similar to most modem involuntary commitment statutes in
that mental illness and a need for treatment are no longer enough
to justify the "massive curtailment of liberty" entailed by
involuntary commitment. 15
Pennsylvania case law indicates, however, that courts have
difficulty interpreting the PMHPA. This difficulty results from the
statute's failure to define "severe mental illness" except by the
exclusion of several conditions, and from the vagueness of the
clear and present danger standard.
The PMHPA's exclusion of "senility" and alcohol and drug
dependence from the definition of mental illness is confusing and
does not comport with current understanding of these conditions.
In the absence of a specific definition of mental illness, the
legislature could improve the PMHPA by simply removing these
exclusions. Mental illness should not be defined by the legislature's
outmoded understanding of mental illness from twenty-three years
ago.
The clear and present danger standard should be interpreted by
courts and by mental health review officers around the state
according to the plain meaning of the statute. Threats of harm to
oneself or others, and acts in furtherance of these threats, may be
used to show clear and present danger, but should not be
mandatory. The legislature, as indicated by the PMHPA:s language,
intended to grant courts the necessary discretion to balance
individuals' rights and the needs of society, in reaching reasonable
determinations of dangerousness in complex situations. Such a
reading of the statute would ultimately lead to greater consistency
in the application of the PMHPA, to the benefit of patients like
Maxwell Edison and his family.
154. Id.
155. REISNER, supra note 10, at 601.
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